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public funds. Similarly, only international public funds have an effect
on efficiency. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis, that
competitive funding reduces the frontier due to monitoring costs, but
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ments and the variation of the identification strategy for university
efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Universities face substantial pressure to use their funding in an efficient man-
ner as public and private agencies tend to provide financial resources based
on competitive funding. Besides, universities have become increasingly im-
portant as part of the national innovation system. Consequently, the interest
to measure and evaluate university productivity has increased substantially
by both the university management and the politics. But there are few ar-
ticles analyzing the impact of different funding resources on productivity of
universities. However, both the theoretical and empirical findings are am-
biguous, indicating that further research in this area is required to allow
policymakers to make evidence-based decisions (see e.g. Van der Ploeg and
Veugelers, 2008).
Public authorities and other third-party agencies that decide on the dis-
tribution of financial resources are reliant on information such as performance
measures to secure effective and efficient employment of funds. This is due to
the fact that the relationship between a donor of third-party funds (principal)
and researcher (agent) is typically modeled in a principal-agent framework
(see e.g. Kivisto¨, 2005). Hence, the significance of applying analysis based
on benchmarks and efficiency measurements in the public non-profit sectors
such as higher education, health care or the cultural sector has become more
important in recent years. Those techniques provide management as well
as policy makers valuable information on efficient production because they
allow the performance comparison of several decision making units against a
benchmark, the so called production frontier, shaped by the most productive
units.
In particular, a strand of the literature analyzes the relevance of funding
restrictions on the efficiency of universities, reporting mixed results (see e.g.
?Kempkes and Pohl, 2008; Kuo and Ho, 2007; Mensah and Werner, 2003).
Following ?, Kempkes and Pohl (2008) and Duh and Kuo (2006) the assump-
tion appears to be confirmed that restrictive regulations and productivity are
negatively related; universities are more efficient, the more autonomy is guar-
anteed by authorities. These findings give evidence for a misallocation effect.
Because of the difference in the utility functions, the principal has an inter-
est to control the agent’s behavior through restrictions. The problem is that
these restrictions are set by the principal facing incomplete information (see
e.g. Schiller and Liefner, 2006).
However, the principal-agent relationship might also be result in a posi-
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tive impact of restricting external funds on productivity due to moral hazard,
because the restrictions on the employment of provided resources might de-
crease the ability of the agent to pursue his own goals at the expense of the
donor (see e.g. Niskanen, 1971, 1975). Such a disciplining effect is supported
by the results of Mensah and Werner (2003) who find a positive correlation
between funding restriction and efficiency. Kuo and Ho (2007) present simi-
lar evidence. Finally, the most apparent channel is the administrative effect
due to the monitoring costs, i.e. the acquisition of external funds requires
the investment of time and money by the researcher. Therefore, the time
available for productive activities decreases. However, unlike the misalloca-
tion and discipline effect, the administrative effect impacts the production
frontier itself, but not the university efficiency.
Evidence of the overall effect of external funding and university efficiency
are presented by Cherchye and Abeele (2005), who find a positive correla-
tion between the share of total third-party funding and research efficiency.
Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) analyze the impact of private funds on efficiency and
find a U-shaped correlation for Italian universities, for which private funding
is of rather limited relevance though. Using data on individual researchers at
the Louis Pasteur University, Carayol and Matt (2006) distinguish between
public and private third-party funding and find a small effect of public funds
on individual productivity. Most importantly, ? analyze the relationship
between productivity and public third-party funding and find a positive re-
lationship. They tackle identification of the causal effect using an elaborate
instrument based on US political institutions.
This paper complements the existing literature and ? in particular in
a number of ways. First, we separately model the influence of third-party
funding on the production frontier and the efficiency of universities, allowing
us to disentangle the administrative effect from the misallocation and dis-
cipline effect. Secondly, the paper analyzes the effect of tuition fees, public
international funding and private funds separately. Thirdly, we explore the
econometric challenges of identifying inefficiency and the influence of budget
shares in the presence of endogeneity and compare a number of possibilities.
More generally, the panel data structure enables us to tackle a broad range of
econometric problems in respect to the identification of causal effects. Most
notable are the country-specific intercepts and trends that capture unob-
served heterogeneity across countries. Moreover, we use lagged values and
averages across a country to instrument budget shares. We also conduct a
system GMM estimation to account for autocorrelation in the data. Fourthly,
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the provided evidence spans eight European countries: Switzerland, United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Spain, Portugal and Italy, thereby
revealing relationships that are valid beyond a particular political system.
We find strong evidence for the administrative effect in respect to public
international funds, as these correlate negatively with the production fron-
tier. Furthermore, we show that the share of the budget financed by public
international funds has a positive effect on efficiency, indicating that the
discipline effect dominates the misallocation effect. Private funds and tu-
ition fees on the other hand have no impact on either production frontier or
efficiency.
The estimation approach along with the specifications of the applied mod-
els are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 provide information on the data
used for the analysis. Estimation results of the empirical analysis are pre-
sented in Section 4 followed by conclusions in Section 5.
2 Estimation Approach
The employed technique, labeled stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), has the
benefit that it accommodates to statistical noise. Furthermore it allows the
integration of third-party factors in the production function. Most notably in
the context of a panel data set is the possibility to account for time invariant
cross unit heterogeneity by using the econometric methodologies described
in Greene (2005a) and Greene (2005b). Due to its parametric nature, the
methodology has the drawback that it requires assumptions concerning the
distribution of inefficiency and the error term in addition to the assumed
functional form. However, using a translog functional form reduces the latter
problem substantially as it provides a second order approximation of the true
function.
Following Abbott and Doucouliagos (2009), we utilize an output distance
function. This has the advantage that universities are modeled as output
maximizing institutions, an assumption that appears reasonable as inputs of
public research institutions are often decided upon by politicians. Further-
more, the use of wages appears problematic, as these are subject to strong
regulation. Therefore, the distance function has the following form:
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where lny1,i,j,t refers to the number of enrolled students of university i
in country j at time t. It captures the amount of teaching and serves as
the normalizing output. The remaining outputs appear as explanatory vari-
ables normalized by students, meaning that y∗m = ym/y1. These consist
of the number of PhD students, also approximating teaching output and
scientific publications capturing basic research. The vector x contains the
amount of labor input differentiated by ”Professors”, ”Assistant Professors”,
”Researchers”, ”Other Administrative Staff” and finally ”Technical and Ad-
ministrative Staff”. j,t refers to a normally distributed error term with mean
zero and variance σ2 . υj refers to inefficiency, or slack of the university. The
observation specific but time-invariant intercepts, αi,j, capture time-invariant
heterogeneity. However, due to the structure of the data, we generally in-
clude country-specific but not individual-specific intercepts in the estimation.
In addition, we use country-specific trends to account for heterogeneous de-
velopments in the analyzed countries.
bsha is a vector of budget shares financed by tuition, international pub-
lic grants and private funds. Including these explanatory variables in the
distance function directly suggests the interpretation that funding competi-
tion affects the production frontier itself. Arguably, university management
controls the shares of third-party funding by introducing corresponding in-
centives, implying that the funding shares influence efficiency but not the
production frontier. In this case the proper econometric strategy consists of
modeling efficiency as a function of the funding shares, but refrain from in-
cluding them in the output distance function directly (see e.g. Cherchye and
Abeele, 2005). However, to the extent that competition pressures universities
at the boundary to increase their effort, the estimated production frontier
might shift as well. Examples for the treatment of the funding structure as
exogenous are Bonaccorsi et al. (2006) and Carayol and Matt (2006). In the
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following, we assume that the funding shares influence both efficiency and
the distance frontier. Therefore, we also model inefficiency υj in the following
inefficiency equation:
υi,j = φ+ ϕ ∗ bsha+ ε2,i,j,t (2)
In order to retain a functional distribution of the inefficiency terms, we
restrict φ0 to zero.
We start our analysis by assuming that no inefficiencies or unobserved
heterogeneity exists, i.e. αi,j is a constant and υi,j is zero. The correspond-
ing estimation technique is OLS. Including the shares of third-party funding
in the output distance function directly yields descriptive evidence of the
relationship between funding sources and productivity. This model yields
estimates of the relationship between budget shares and the average pro-
duction function. Inefficiencies are neither modeled nor identified in this
specification.
Setting aside the issue of unobserved heterogeneity for the moment, we
estimate a model that includes a full set of fixed effects. Pitt and Lee (1981)
and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) suggest to interpret the predicted individ-
ual intercepts as inefficiency. In a second step, it is possible to regress the
predicted individual intercepts on budget shares. In econometric terms, this
amounts to estimating two OLS estimations. The benefit of this estima-
tor is the flexibility in respect to the modeling strategy in the inefficiency
equation. Furthermore, it allows us to disentangle changes in the produc-
tion frontier and the efficiency of universities. However, this approach suffers
from a simultaneity bias as the two equations should be estimated simulta-
neously. Furthermore, depending on the number of observations over time,
T, the estimated individual intercepts suffer from an incidental parameter
problem (see e.g. Lancaster, 2000). Another drawback is that the estimated
efficiencies are constant over time.
Before moving towards an alternative identification strategy for ineffi-
ciency, we explore the possibility to account for reverse causality by employ-
ing a system GMM estimator. The reasoning behind this approach lies in the
relevance of time-persistence in university performance due to self-reinforcing
processes, e.g. good staff choosing universities with high reputation. Ac-
counting for autocorrelation appears a natural and effective approach to deal
with this type of endogeneity.
Alternatively, Aigner et al. (1977) as well as Meeusen and van den Broeck
5
(1977) propose to identify inefficiency by the assumption that inefficiencies
follow a truncated normal distribution. Building on this idea, the methodol-
ogy proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) allows to estimate the inefficien-
cies and their determinants, i.e. funding shares simultaneously. However,
this technique does not account for the panel structure of the data, implying
that the original assumption of a half-normal distribution of inefficiencies
across a cross-section needs to hold in the pooled version as well. In order
to account for this issue, we estimate the two panel data frontiers proposed
in Battese and Coelli (1992). The first assumes time-invariant inefficiency,
while the latter allows inefficiency to develop over time according to:
υi,j,t = exp{−η(t− Ti)}ui (3)
For this estimator, υ 6= ui and therefore we perform the second stage
regressions with technical efficiency υ instead of technical inefficiency as the
dependent variable. This approach has the benefit that the expected signs
are the same as the estimation based on a fixed effects estimator.
Greene (2005a) and Greene (2005b) criticizes the fact that the above mod-
els do not account for time invariant cross unit heterogeneity. This criticism
becomes particularly relevant if the research question concerns the determi-
nants of inefficiency, as a correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
and the error term results in an omitted variable bias that renders the es-
timated coefficients inconsistent. We approach this problem by including
country-specific intercepts and, where possible, trends in the above estima-
tions. This should capture a large part of worrisome heterogeneity.
In order to account for reverse causality, we use average funding shares
at the country level to instrument for university-specific funding shares. The
idea of the approach is that the political regime in a country is exogenous,
implying that the average funding share is independent of the current level of
university efficiency. This approach uses a very specific part of the observed
variation, namely the variation between countries to test the impact of third-
party funding on the efficiency of universities.
The use of past values of funding shares as an instrument for the current
funding shares represents an alternative to using country level funding share
averages as instruments. The problem with this methodology is that the
corresponding econometric strategy is a three stage estimator that includes
a truncated normal distributed inefficiency term in the third stage and an
estimation of unobserved heterogeneity using simulation techniques. To our
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knowledge, such an estimator is not implemented in the standard software.
Therefore we estimate distance functions in the first step, calculate predicted
inefficiencies and regress these on a set of country dummies, country-specific
trends and budget shares, where the latter can be instrumented using 2SLS.
We address the problem of simultaneity by bootstrapping the standard errors
of the inefficiency equation.
3 Data
The data used in this study stems from the Aquameth database1, a European
project that has established a data set which contains comparable statistics
with respect to universities across a large number of European countries;
that is Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland
and United Kingdom. The data is unbalanced, spanning from 1994 to 2006.
We use information on the number of enrolled Bachelor and Master stu-
dents as well as the number of PhD students to capture teaching output of
the universities. The number of publications reflects the output of research.
Five labor categories serve as inputs (”Professors”, ”Assistant Professors”,
”Researchers”, ”Other Administrative Staff” and finally ”Technical and Ad-
ministrative Staff”). Note that despite all efforts, the definition of input
variables varies across countries. Most notably, not all countries report full-
time equivalent employment contracts. Furthermore, the labor categories
appear somewhat fuzzy as well.
The data also includes information on financial resources of each uni-
versity; that is the shares of total budget financed by tuition fees, private
funds and international public funds. However, the usefulness of these varies
substantially, where tuition fees present the largest problem. Norway and
Finland do not have any tuition fees and in the remaining countries, the
process of raising fees is strongly regulated. As a consequence, there is little
variation over time. This feature collides with the fact that this study utilizes
the panel structure of the data to establish a credible identification strategy.
Both public international funds and private funds contain enough variation
over time to render the argument above irrelevant. However, we account for
the universities third mission - technology transfer - only indirectly by includ-
ing PhD students. To the extent that private principals target other channels
1see http://www.prime-noe.org/index.php?project=prime&locale=en&level1=
menu1_prime_1b8057d059a36720_21&level2=2&doc=Projects_Universities&page=2
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of technology transfer, our output distance function might not capture the
impact of private funding appropriately.
The descriptive statistics are given in the Appendix. As can be seen
from Table 1 both the outputs, inputs as well as the budget shares cover
a wide range of data values with respect e.g. to country size (number of
universities, number of students, labor inputs) and the political system of
tertiary education (introduction of tuition fees, public and private budgets).
Table 2 shows the cross-correlation between the variables and indicates that
most of the inputs and outputs are correlated with each other. However, the
analyzed budget shares show little evidence of correlation to the inputs and
outputs. Exceptions are the share of tuition fees, which has a weak negative
correlation and a correlation coefficient of .3 between private funding and
publications. International public funds are not correlated to either inputs
or outputs. Moreover, it is unrelated to the other budget shares as well, while
private funding and tuition fees are negatively correlated. These findings are
relevant to assess the problems of multi-collinearity and endogeneity. Based
on the cross-correlations, these issues should not be that dramatic.
As quality data of the universities in our sample are not available as much
as needed quality indicators could not be included in the analyzes. However,
the quality of teaching and research of universities might be captured by
fixed effects assuming that quality will probably not markedly change that
much over a period of four years.
We manipulate the data in a number of ways: We interpolate all variables
linearly. Moreover, we had to drop France, Germany and Hungary from
the sample due to incomplete data. We also exclude all observations where
data on the budget shares financed by international public grants or private
funding are not available. We restrain from doing so for tuition fees as
Norway and Finland do not have tuition fees which reflect the policy of
the tertiary education system in these countries. Furthermore, we eliminate
observations for which all outputs are missing. Finally, we replace outputs
and inputs (and the budget share of tuition fees) by 0.01 (0.00001) to account
for the logarithmic form of the distance function. However, our results are
robust to the value of replacement. All variables are normalized by the
median.
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4 Results
Table 3 displays the results based on an OLS distance function regression
including the share of budget financed by tuition fees, public international
funds and private funds. These are included on the university level at first
and then as an aggregation on the country level. This aggregation step helps
to alleviate problems of endogeneity as the average budget shares are largely
determined by politicians. The table further shows fixed effect estimators in
columns 3 and 4. As before, the two distance functions vary in respect to the
aggregation level of budget shares. The last column presents the estimates
of a system GMM estimator including budget shares on the university level.
The coefficients are well-behaving for the OLS estimates in the sense that
the first-order coefficients of outputs are negative and significant, while in-
puts are positive and significant. The fixed effects distance equations are
somewhat less appropriate, though the direction of the impact is correctly
estimated. The GMM results depict well-behaving outputs but misbehaving
inputs, indicating that this estimation might be poorly specified. The estima-
tions further contain country-specific dummy variables, where Switzerland is
the base category. Furthermore, the OLS and fixed effects models contain
country-specific trends. In respect to tuition, we find a positive significant
coefficient for the OLS and FE equations that use university level budget
shares, an insignificant result for country level budget shares and a negative
result indicated by the GMM. The picture is clearer for public international
funds, which are not significant in the OLS regressions but turn significantly
negative in the fixed effects distance functions. Similarly, the GMM indi-
cates a negative influence as well. Private funds remain insignificant in all
estimations.
Table 4 shows the results of regressing the predicted fixed effects based
on column 3 of Table 3 on a set of country dummies and the budget shares.
The individual columns vary by the employed instrument. While column
2 uses the original values, columns 3 to 5 instrument contemporary budget
shares by their 1 year, 2 years and 3 years lag. Similarly, column 6 uses
country averages to instrumentalize budget shares. Budget shares financed
by tuition fees and private funds do not appear to influence the efficiency of
universities. Public international funds on the other hand have a significant
positive impact on efficiency if the instrument is not lagged by too long. This
finding is consistent with an interpretation that the competition for public
international funds forces universities to increase efficiency. Note that lags 2
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or longer, the significant impact disappears. This suggests that autocorrela-
tion within budget shares might not be high. Therefore, this finding can be
interpreted as good news in respect to the problem of endogeneity. However,
over-identifying restriction tests reject the validity of the instruments.
The above estimations face the problem of simultaneity. We address this
challenge in Table 5, where we identify inefficiency based on the assump-
tion that inefficiencies are distributed half-normally. Based on Battese and
Coelli (1995), we regress the predicted inefficiencies on budget shares in a
simultaneous manner. As above, the columns of Table 5 differ by the in-
strument choice. However, as this estimator does not exist simultaneously,
we estimate the first stage of the instrumental-variable approach manually
and use these to predict budget shares and to insert these in the inefficiency
equation. Bootstrapping the results helps to alleviate the non-simultaneity
of the estimations.
Inspecting the results reveals well-behaving distance functions. In respect
to the budget shares in the distance function, we find no impact of tuition and
private funding on the production frontier, while public international funds
have a negative impact. The lower part of Table 5 shows that inefficiencies are
unaffected by private funds, positively affected by tuition fees and negatively
affected by public international funds. These findings are consistent with
those above, as the dependent variable has been efficiency in the two-stage
approach presented above but inefficiency in the simultaneous estimator.
Battese and Coelli (1992) developed two panel data estimators: In the
first, inefficiency is assumed time-invariant while it follows an exponential
time trend in the latter. Table 6 depicts the results of these two estima-
tors together with a pooled stochastic frontier that assumes no truncation
of the inefficiency term, i.e. budget shares enter only the distance function
directly. The distance functions of the panel estimators are not particularly
well-behaving. Nevertheless, all three estimators indicate a negative corre-
lation between budget shares and the production frontier. Table 7 portrays
the corresponding results of the efficiency equation, revealing a positive im-
pact of tuition fees and international public funding. The pooled and the
time-varying panel frontier estimator allow inefficiencies to vary over time.
Therefore, the interpretation of the panel estimator assuming time-invariant
inefficiency is somewhat different, namely an influence on the level of ineffi-
ciency, while the other estimators may say something about variation over
time as well. This is particularly relevant in respect to endogeneity. Assum-
ing that endogeneity is stronger in levels than in differences, the problem of
10
endogeneity is more worrisome in the case of time-invariant inefficiency.
Table 8 displays the regressions of predicted efficiencies based on the
time-varying panel frontier on budget shares exploiting the presence of in-
struments. The results indicate a positive relationship of public international
funds for the original values and up to 2 lags, but insignificant otherwise. Tu-
ition tends to be positive too.
The dependent variable in Tables 9 and 10 is efficiency based on either
the pooled frontier model or the time-varying panel frontier model. In these
tables, we attempt to increase the stringency of controls even more. While
Table 9 shows the results of a system GMM, Table 10 reports estimates that
includes either a full set of fixed effects in the regression (see columns 2 and
4) or no individual components at all (columns 3 and 5). While the latter
does not affect the results, using a GMM or fixed effects regression turns out
to eliminate the significance of coefficients for budget shares. However, the
insignificance of country-specific control variables suggests that the model
might not be parsimonious, rendering a proper interpretation to be difficult.
Finally, Table 11 uses a simplified output distance function to estimate
pooled frontiers for five countries: Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom. While the small number of observations renders most
distance functions problematic, the results indicate that our findings are not
driven by a single country. This interpretation is supported by a set of
regressions dropping a country at a time, revealing robust results.
5 Conclusion
We exploit a panel data set across eight European countries to explore the
causal relationship between competitive university funding and productivity.
We find mixed evidence in respect to tuition fees. Private funding appears
unrelated to both the production frontier and efficiency. Public international
funds on the other hand significantly reduce the production frontier, but
also increase efficiency. This finding is in accordance with the hypothesis
that competitive funding mechanisms reduce available resources due to mon-
itoring costs, but increase competition between universities, thereby enhance
efficiency.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total
q1 2347 18111.29 21243.68 0 184350
q2 2091 906.9296 1040.726 0 10559
q3 2171 666.6472 914.7857 0 6543
x1 2325 340.2342 516.8687 0 3932
x2 2165 319.0083 327.9615 0 2342
x3 1812 612.9123 727.6172 0 7013
x4 2179 281.7342 383.6113 0 2504
x5 2333 884.73 801.1245 15 7185
bsha tuit1 2194 0.1797148 .1020997 . 592 0.7042379
bsha pub int1 2399 0.020329 0.0287659 0 0.5498551
bsha priv1 2399 0.0508786 0.0676603 0 0.4020464
Finland
q1 160 7148.95 7012.158 208 32344
q2 160 1077.706 1262.84 8 5778
q3 120 502.2667 794.8445 0 3747
x1 160 109.4563 106.6427 4 475
x2 0
x3 160 360.5313 436.1619 0 1984
x4 160 275.6625 261.6155 17 1177
x5 160 694.2625 811.8822 25 3759
bsha tuit1 0
bsha pub int1 160 0.0352147 0.0299931 0 0.1326203
bsha priv1 160 0.180496 0.0689972 0.0176338 0.4019512
Italy
q1 411 29953.18 28714.98 100 184350
q2 179 410.6704 412.5894 0 2095
q3 337 565.5282 577.7378 0 2866
x1 419 270.1026 257.2283 6 1444
x2 419 302.6659 272.9535 5 1389
x3 419 351.3389 338.0503 1 2065
x4 377 397.6499 415.0535 0 2504
x5 420 1071.421 1178.736 66 7185
bsha tuit1 463 0.1109347 0.0483366 0.0000592 0.3318165
bsha pub int1 463 0.0079433 0.0326173 0 0.5498551
bsha priv1 463 0.0393991 0.0444575 0 0.2595776
Netherlands
q1 120 13469.09 5787.845 3740 26594
q2 120 397.0583 156.7408 128 786
q3 120 1653.55 801.5135 154 3614
x1 120 189.0583 73.65195 88 320
x2 120 191.2333 81.47152 72 406
x3 120 1164.208 500.3453 274 2268
x4 120 1287.358 445.2787 401 2183
x5 120 1564.658 604.9633 483 2798
bsha tuit1 120 0.0543109 0.0211888 0.0137321 0.1739064
bsha pub int1 120 0.0184264 0.0176943 0 0.0987073
bsha priv1 120 0.0901295 0.0463064 0 0.2365367
Norway
q1 45 11767.71 10532.13 1606 35143
q2 21 55.80952 29.37111 10 102
q3 45 546.5778 585.1314 7 1959
x1 24 467 211.2633 161 800
x2 24 439.375 135.7347 226 693
x3 24 262.3333 98.9478 113 431
x4 24 675.4583 313.5825 229 1143
x5 24 384.625 252.1092 145 991
bsha tuit1 0
bsha pub int1 45 0.0143875 0.0085694 0.0001155 0.0331295
bsha priv1 45 0.0394165 0.0326423 0.0013468 0.1463669
Portugal
q1 70 10257.17 6831.306 1877 23055
q2 70 674.7246 601.1097 14.95116 2108.114
q3 70 281.5 283.5708 2 944
x1 70 76.04286 74.08523 3 215
x2 70 118.8143 106.7044 5 389
x3 70 257.6429 218.7996 21 761
x4 70 487.4857 289.7597 138 1056
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total
x5 70 632.8286 445.9628 102 1433
bsha tuit1 70 0.0527236 0.025404 0.0011267 0.1202999
bsha pub int1 70 0.0694642 0.0451896 0.0113381 0.2323929
bsha priv1 70 0.2261399 0.0716107 0.104706 0.3894713
Spain
q1 513 30563.79 25381.9 298 146330
q2 513 1316.111 1280.571 0 10559
q3 513 382.1676 386.9228 0 2250
x1 513 991.345 747.277 12 3932
x2 513 603.3431 396.9402 0 2342
x3 0
x4 512 171.2324 191.8007 0 1605
x5 513 853.5185 625.3121 46 3563
bsha tuit1 513 0.1877321 0.0691517 0.0247243 0.588671
bsha pub int1 513 0.0305753 0.0314007 0 0.2018694
bsha priv1 513 0.012073 0.0130734 0 0.1019891
Switzerland
q1 105 6760.105 4448.253 164 19932
q2 105 1126.181 786.8955 0 3171
q3 72 1283.486 724.5352 185 2562
x1 103 238.9709 122.7026 16 401
x2 103 535.5728 481.5319 26 2024
x3 103 1928.796 1665.197 15 7013
x4 0
x5 103 1111.068 891.1526 18 3362
bsha tuit1 105 0.033132 0.0338876 0.0067675 0.174845
bsha pub int1 105 0.0124514 0.0215478 0 0.1337236
bsha priv1 105 0.0841589 0.0901521 0 0.4020464
United Kingdom
q1 923 10617.25 12250.3 0 141635
q2 923 824.467 961.1804 0 6258
q3 894 744.123 1163.429 0 6543
x1 916 96.03344 105.2618 0 628
x2 916 171.7763 161.6422 0 1178
x3 916 592.7937 571.4389 0 3610
x4 916 139.0718 199.4585 0 2300
x5 923 768.5948 629.3424 15 4024
bsha tuit1 923 0.2523708 0.085548 0.0919563 0.7042379
bsha pub int1 923 0.0159734 0.0167875 0 0.187404
bsha priv1 923 0.0341143 0.0400764 0 0.1866709
Table 2: Cross-correlations between variables
q1 q2 q3 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 bsha tuition bsha int public
q1 1
q2 0.5183 1
q3 0.1546 0.6026 1
x1 0.6482 0.5999 0.1446 1
x2 0.6246 0.6993 0.3176 0.8097 1
x3 0.1886 0.6297 0.7158 0.471 0.5824 1
x4 0.2224 0.1705 0.4536 0.1212 0.1521 0.3839 1
x5 0.619 0.6877 0.6493 0.4357 0.6135 0.6419 0.4992 1
Bsha Tuition 0.0426 -0.0628 -0.2816 -0.0467 -0.1608 -0.2763 -0.4059 -0.223 1
Bsha Int Public -0.0803 0.122 0.0688 0.0551 0.0404 0.0481 -0.0234 -0.0168 -0.1171 1
Bsha Private -0.1975 0.1427 0.3014 -0.196 -0.0832 0.1115 0.2731 0.079 -0.4123 0.2539
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Table 3: OLS, Fixed Effects and GMM Output Distance Functions for budget
shares on university and country level
OLS uni OLS coun FE uni FE coun GMM 1
lq2 -0.377*** -0.379*** -0.315*** -0.314*** -0.074**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.069) (0.071) (0.032)
lq3 -0.108*** -0.132*** -0.037 -0.054** -0.313***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.029) (0.021) (0.040)
q2q2 -0.061*** -0.058*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006)
q3q3 -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
q2q3 0.005** 0.004* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
lx1 0.234*** 0.245** 0.131* 0.121 0.038
(0.066) (0.076) (0.079) (0.082) (0.052)
lx2 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.265*** 0.262*** 0.095*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.064) (0.067) (0.053)
lx3 0.298*** 0.279*** 0.250*** 0.236*** 0.097
(0.040) (0.044) (0.083) (0.076) (0.076)
lx4 0.048** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.002
(0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016)
lx5 0.191*** 0.177*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.080
(0.031) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031) (0.089)
x1x1 0.042** 0.044** 0.024** 0.022* 0.013
(0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.021)
x2x2 0.025* 0.023 0.046 0.045 0.029**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031) (0.015)
x3x3 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.048**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019)
x4x4 0.015** 0.012 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
x5x5 -0.053 -0.051 -0.120 -0.120 0.079
(0.111) (0.107) (0.125) (0.115) (0.079)
x1x3 0.015 0.016 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020)
x1x4 0.005 0.009* 0.002 0.005 -0.009*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
x1x5 -0.039* -0.047* -0.013 -0.012 -0.001
(0.017) (0.021) (0.043) (0.044) (0.026)
x2x3 0.006 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.003
(0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.006)
x2x4 -0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.002 0.037***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008)
x2x5 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 -0.009 -0.052**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023)
x3x4 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
x3x5 0.045 0.044 0.062 0.059 -0.017
(0.047) (0.044) (0.045) (0.040) (0.017)
x4x5 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
x1q2 0.002 0.002 0.008** 0.008*** -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
x1q3 -0.009** -0.012** -0.008 -0.009 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
x2q2 -0.026** -0.023* -0.030*** -0.027*** 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
x2q3 -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
x3q1 -0.096* -0.101* -0.086* -0.087** -0.062***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.017)
x3q2 -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
x3q3 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
x4q1 -0.082*** -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.086*** -0.031***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
x4q2 -0.010** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
x4q3 -0.007*** -0.009** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
x5q1 0.057 0.058 0.041 0.042 -0.005
(0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
x5q2 0.016** 0.017** 0.011 0.009 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
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x5q3 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010)
Finland 2.451** 0.025 1.598 0.233 1.248
(1.022) (1.105) (1.346) (0.959) (5.709)
Italy 0.963*** 1.539*** 0.938*** 1.185*** 2.509
(0.208) (0.195) (0.251) (0.286) (5.806)
Netherlands -0.506** -0.739* -0.310 -0.473 6.764
(0.171) (0.318) (0.359) (0.387) (8.288)
Norway 1.533* -0.566 1.109** -0.001 -9.787
(0.659) (0.862) (0.543) (0.342) (13.250)
Portugal 0.968*** 0.712 1.160*** 0.919*** -0.190
(0.242) (0.522) (0.251) (0.309) (4.089)
Spain -0.278 0.435 0.581 0.869 0.819
(1.006) (0.949) (0.843) (0.780) (6.086)
United Kingdom 0.251 0.871*** 0.379 0.613 1.723
(0.189) (0.118) (0.420) (0.408) (6.478)
Trend Finland 0.023 0.047** 0.020* 0.033***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012)
Trend Italy -0.143*** -0.266*** -0.078*** -0.147***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.019) (0.015)
Trend Netherlands 0.034*** 0.094** 0.032*** 0.062***
(0.004) (0.032) (0.003) (0.011)
Trend Norway -0.057 -0.122** -0.055*** -0.090***
(0.033) (0.050) (0.014) (0.014)
Trend Portugal -0.054** 0.041 -0.040 0.014
(0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.018)
Trend Spain 0.020 -0.000 0.012 0.001
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Trend Switzerland -0.030 -0.051** -0.001 -0.024**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.003) (0.011)
Trend United Kingdom -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.007*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Bsha Tuition 0.201** 0.131** -0.050*
(0.059) (0.056) (0.027)
Bsha Int Public -0.007 -0.011*** -0.004*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Bsha Private 0.007 -0.010 0.006
(0.021) (0.009) (0.006)
Bsha Tuition Average -0.079 -0.016
(0.109) (0.054)
Bsha Int Public Average -0.322 -0.184***
(0.172) (0.066)
Bsha Private Average 0.183 0.079
(0.099) (0.049)
L.lq1 0.087***
(0.028)
Constant -0.194 -0.666*** -0.593*** -0.762*** -2.080
(0.147) (0.140) (0.223) (0.228) (5.804)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2103.000
Wald chi2 . . 1220.842
Prob ¿ chi2 . . . . 0.000
The table displays coefficients, robust standard errors, which are ;
clustered at the country level, are shown in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2: OLS including budget shares at institution level
Column 3: OLS including budget shares at country level
Column 4: Fixed effect model including budget shares at institution level
Column 5: Fixed effect model including budget shares at country level
Column 6: GMM estimator including budget shares at institution level
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Table 4: Regression of Estimated Fixed Effects on Budget Shares
No Instrument 1 Year Lag 2 Year Lag 3 Year Lag Country Average
Finland 5.908*** 4.979 -37.252 -51.788 -2.628
(1.342) (5.403) (1974.584) (164.894) (5.110)
Italy -1.259*** -1.067 6.534 8.792 -0.463
(0.332) (1.098) (368.534) (30.385) (1.300)
Netherlands 0.197 0.391 5.299 6.575 -3.458***
(0.193) (0.655) (227.762) (19.443) (1.013)
Norway 6.543*** 5.488 -37.834 -51.972 2.545
(1.345) (5.522) (2028.417) (168.662) (4.934)
Portugal -0.428* -0.199 4.317 6.179 -8.928***
(0.231) (0.648) (154.387) (18.676) (1.608)
Spain -0.225 -0.046 10.298 15.536 0.641
(0.373) (1.435) (471.033) (42.769) (1.653)
United Kingdom -1.826*** -1.566 10.738 15.784 -0.828
(0.413) (1.649) (571.401) (49.582) (1.784)
Bsha Tuition 0.818*** 0.680 -4.900 -6.803 0.632
(0.173) (0.717) (260.812) (21.855) (0.609)
Bsha Int Public 0.110*** 0.122** 0.179 -0.316 0.806***
(0.032) (0.050) (4.441) (0.722) (0.183)
Bsha Private 0.051 -0.026 -0.675 -0.299 2.477***
(0.034) (0.086) (32.192) (2.247) (0.603)
Constant 0.852** 0.591 -10.201 -14.781 2.553*
(0.364) (1.454) (499.740) (43.592) (1.386)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2 1461.076 1980.810 56.559 81.087 147.326
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2: Budget shares are not instrumented
Column 3: Budget shares are instrumented using a one year lag
Column 4: Budget shares are instrumented using a two year lag
Column 5: Budget shares are instrumented using a three year lag
Column 6: Budget shares are instrumented using country averages
Table 5: Pooled Stochastic Frontier and Simultaneous Regression of Inefficiency
on Budget Shares
No Instrument 1 Year Lag 2 Year Lag 3 Year Lag Country Average
lq2 -0.387*** -0.379*** -0.379*** -0.360*** -0.364***
(0.050) (0.042) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
lq3 -0.156*** -0.156*** -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.131***
(0.029) (0.022) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022)
q2q2 -0.060*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.052***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
q3q3 -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.015***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
q2q3 0.014** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.005
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
lx1 0.356*** 0.334*** 0.339*** 0.315*** 0.286***
(0.063) (0.039) (0.042) (0.047) (0.029)
lx2 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.107*** 0.120*** 0.126***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026)
lx3 0.303*** 0.300*** 0.307*** 0.285*** 0.264***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)
lx4 0.018 0.033** 0.035* 0.039** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
lx5 0.161* 0.169** 0.158** 0.197*** 0.212***
(0.086) (0.077) (0.075) (0.075) (0.046)
x1x1 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.052***
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008)
x2x2 -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
x3x3 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
x4x4 0.009* 0.010* 0.010** 0.010 0.012*
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(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
x5x5 0.115*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.083** 0.083**
(0.044) (0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037)
x1x3 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.013*
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
x1x4 -0.003 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.017**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
x1x5 -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.071*** -0.068***
(0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
x2x3 0.008** 0.007*** 0.005* 0.007** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
x2x4 -0.004 -0.007* -0.008 -0.006 -0.007*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
x2x5 -0.016 -0.013* -0.011 -0.011 -0.013
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
x3x4 -0.005*** -0.003* -0.003* -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
x3x5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.008
(0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
x4x5 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.047***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007)
x1q2 -0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.010 -0.005
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
x1q3 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
x2q2 -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
x2q3 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
x3q1 -0.076*** -0.073*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.066***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
x3q2 -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
x3q3 -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009* -0.006*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
x4q1 -0.059*** -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.080***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.008)
x4q2 -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
x4q3 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
x5q1 0.040** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.031***
(0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008)
x5q2 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.018* 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
x5q3 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Finland 0.934 1.424 -1.426 15.229* 0.007
(1.292) (1.028) (3.384) (8.643) (0.731)
Italy 0.448 0.791 1.533* -1.622 1.031
(0.406) (0.516) (0.852) (1.460) (0.632)
Netherlands -0.582** -0.514** -0.193 -2.059** -0.577*
(0.293) (0.244) (0.421) (0.987) (0.302)
Norway -0.845 -0.367 -2.779 13.911 -1.265*
(1.324) (1.040) (3.481) (8.959) (0.663)
Portugal 0.309 0.533* 0.873** -0.806 0.544*
(0.393) (0.284) (0.428) (0.909) (0.297)
Spain 0.268 0.249 0.679 -2.784 0.619
(0.390) (0.364) (0.903) (1.979) (0.445)
United Kingdom 0.709 0.781* 1.531 -3.181 1.182***
(0.464) (0.414) (1.011) (2.508) (0.373)
Trend Finland 0.022 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.032***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.027) (0.010)
Trend Italy -0.022 -0.046 -0.091 -0.063 -0.063
(0.076) (0.059) (0.066) (0.076) (0.055)
Trend Netherlands 0.040*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.057***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Trend Norway -0.021 -0.028 -0.045* -0.047 -0.059**
(0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.023)
Trend Portugal 0.031 0.017 -0.000 0.007 0.036*
(0.047) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Trend Spain 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Trend Switzerland -0.040** -0.025** -0.025** -0.019** -0.022
(0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014)
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No Instrument 1 Year Lag 2 Year Lag 3 Year Lag Country Average
Trend United Kingdom -0.024** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.015* -0.015**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Bsha Tuition -0.034 0.018 -0.323 1.839 -0.112*
(0.140) (0.121) (0.438) (1.132) (0.066)
Bsha Int Public -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.125*** -0.080***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.045) (0.021)
Bsha Private -0.008 0.005 -0.036 0.279* 0.069
(0.008) (0.015) (0.044) (0.144) (0.051)
Constant -0.138 -0.228 -0.896 3.143 -0.679*
(0.301) (0.351) (0.877) (2.158) (0.347)
lnsig2v
Constant -3.643 -3.625** -3.435** -3.640* -3.316***
(2.248) (1.624) (1.525) (2.048) (0.309)
Inefficiency
Finland -6.337 7.923** -23.641 14.962 -39.311*
(9.754) (3.179) (19.128) (9.618) (21.301)
Italy -1.228 0.327 0.418 -1.418 3.589
(3.464) (0.380) (0.427) (1.851) (2.397)
Netherlands -4.837 -6.812 -4.074 -4.609 -16.335
(2.972) (10.134) (5.264) (6.009) (9.957)
Norway -7.638 5.532 4.508 7.913 -41.185*
(10.914) (10.514) (11.787) (10.024) (21.560)
Portugal -29.632*** -3.393* -9.456 -4.044** -14.748*
(10.968) (1.799) (7.715) (1.900) (7.821)
Spain -7.550 -28.542*** -11.173** -8.125*** -9.111***
(6.116) (9.957) (5.227) (1.400) (3.270)
United Kingdom -1.673 -1.985*** -2.308*** -2.300** -0.988
(2.462) (0.583) (0.583) (1.047) (2.032)
Bsha Tuition -0.410 1.088*** 1.029*** 2.005** 4.852
(1.791) (0.257) (0.333) (0.949) (3.376)
Bsha Int Public -0.131** -0.145* -0.018 -1.066** 0.269
(0.058) (0.086) (0.111) (0.487) (0.316)
Bsha Private -0.154 -0.013 -0.379* 1.095 2.391***
(0.147) (0.157) (0.203) (0.878) (0.675)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2 725206.820 626450.405 269616.077 505051.085 722035.519
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2: Budget share are not instrumented
Column 3: Budget share are instrumented using a one year lag
Column 4: Budget share are instrumented using a two year lag
Column 5: Budget share are instrumented using a three year lag
Column 6: Budget share are instrumented using country averages
Table 6: Panel Data Stochastic Frontier Estimates
Pooled SFA Panel SFA, Constant Panel SFA, Varying
lq2 -0.375*** -0.072 -0.074
(0.023) (0.067) (0.101)
lq3 -0.130*** -0.052* -0.059**
(0.024) (0.030) (0.028)
q2q2 -0.060*** -0.010 -0.010
(0.005) (0.011) (0.016)
q3q3 -0.018*** -0.009 -0.010*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
q2q3 0.014*** 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
lx1 0.329*** 0.102** 0.088*
(0.033) (0.042) (0.049)
lx2 0.157*** 0.171** 0.179***
(0.038) (0.079) (0.061)
lx3 0.137*** 0.100* 0.106**
(0.042) (0.052) (0.051)
lx4 0.021 0.005 0.006
(0.017) (0.015) (0.021)
lx5 0.264*** 0.257*** 0.252***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.058)
x1x1 0.063*** 0.018** 0.016*
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Pooled SFA Panel SFA, Constant Panel SFA, Varying
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
x2x2 0.023* 0.032* 0.033*
(0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
x3x3 0.027** 0.027** 0.030**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
x4x4 0.010 0.009 0.009
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
x5x5 0.095* -0.082 -0.087
(0.053) (0.066) (0.073)
x1x3 0.014* -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
x1x4 0.006 0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
x1x5 -0.094*** 0.003 0.005
(0.015) (0.026) (0.028)
x2x3 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007)
x2x4 -0.003 0.012 0.012
(0.006) (0.027) (0.020)
x2x5 -0.018 -0.013 -0.013
(0.012) (0.033) (0.032)
x3x4 -0.006** -0.005 -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
x3x5 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.035**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
x4x5 0.052*** 0.055* 0.053*
(0.012) (0.028) (0.027)
x1q2 -0.002 0.005 0.005
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
x1q3 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
x2q2 -0.019 -0.012 -0.014*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
x2q3 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
x3q1 -0.077*** -0.046** -0.053***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.020)
x3q2 -0.014*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
x3q3 -0.007* -0.007* -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
x4q1 -0.077*** -0.077** -0.074**
(0.011) (0.030) (0.033)
x4q2 -0.011*** -0.007* -0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
x4q3 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
x5q1 0.040*** 0.004 0.010
(0.014) (0.040) (0.037)
x5q2 0.016 -0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
x5q3 0.000 0.007 0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Finland 0.285 1.226 1.067
(0.818) (1.053) (1.168)
Italy 0.941* 1.190*** 1.157
(0.513) (0.337) (0.824)
Netherlands -0.264 0.431* 0.411
(0.307) (0.254) (0.786)
Norway -0.097 1.576** 1.412
(0.614) (0.695) (0.976)
Portugal 0.598 1.053*** 0.996
(0.364) (0.352) (0.797)
Spain -0.070 1.130 0.814
(0.625) (1.027) (1.157)
United Kingdom 0.771** 1.710*** 1.577*
(0.335) (0.591) (0.844)
Trend Finland 0.034*** 0.030** 0.047***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Trend Italy -0.107** 0.006 0.013
(0.050) (0.017) (0.015)
Trend Netherlands 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.031***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
Trend Norway -0.077** -0.040*** -0.028
(0.031) (0.014) (0.032)
Trend Portugal 0.024 -0.011 -0.002
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Pooled SFA Panel SFA, Constant Panel SFA, Varying
(0.040) (0.019) (0.017)
Trend Spain 0.014** -0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Trend Switzerland -0.033** 0.001 0.007
(0.013) (0.010) (0.024)
Trend United Kingdom -0.017 0.008 0.031*
(0.012) (0.007) (0.017)
Bsha Tuition -0.014 0.053 0.047
(0.076) (0.034) (0.035)
Bsha Int Public -0.019*** -0.009* -0.010**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Bsha Private -0.008 -0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.054 -0.377 -0.388
(0.327) (0.292) (0.782)
lnsig2v
Constant -3.921
(3.837)
Inefficiency
Constant 0.000
(0.000)
lnsigma2
Constant 1.271*** 1.311*
(0.471) (0.705)
ilgtgamma
Constant 4.677*** 4.730***
(0.763) (1.070)
mu
Constant 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
eta
Constant -0.012
(0.014)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2 1217787.830 58978.776 671988.269
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses;
Standard errors are bootstrapped in the simple stochastic frontiers.
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2: Pooled stochastic frontier allowing inefficiency to vary freely over time
Column 3: Panel stochastic frontier assuming time-invariant inefficiency
Column 4: Panel stochastic frontier assuming time-varying inefficiency
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Table 7: Regressions of Estimated Technical Efficiencies on Budget Shares
Pooled SFA Panel SFA, Constant Panel SFA, Varying
Finland 0.223* 0.342 0.324*
(0.104) (0.184) (0.169)
Italy -0.097*** -0.193*** -0.195***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.035)
Netherlands -0.069** -0.103*** -0.129***
(0.028) (0.016) (0.024)
Norway 0.022 0.397* 0.596***
(0.108) (0.183) (0.170)
Portugal -0.033 -0.137*** -0.034
(0.035) (0.014) (0.033)
Spain -0.033 -0.500*** -0.479***
(0.030) (0.045) (0.046)
United Kingdom -0.144*** -0.653*** -0.679***
(0.036) (0.052) (0.052)
Trend Finland -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trend Italy -0.005*** -0.009***
(0.000) (0.001)
Trend Netherlands 0.005** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002)
Trend Norway 0.017*** -0.035***
(0.001) (0.001)
Trend Portugal -0.005 -0.030***
(0.005) (0.007)
Trend Spain -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trend Switzerland -0.002 -0.011***
(0.003) (0.002)
Trend United Kingdom -0.001** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Bsha Tuition 0.028* 0.080** 0.080***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.022)
Bsha Int Public 0.004 0.008** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Bsha Private 0.012** -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.735*** 0.838*** 0.884***
(0.034) (0.043) (0.044)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2
Prob ¿ chi2 . . .
The table displays coefficients, standard errors are in parentheses;
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the country level.
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2: Pooled stochastic frontier allowing inefficiency to vary freely over time
Column 3: Panel stochastic frontier assuming time-invariant inefficiency
Column 4: Panel stochastic frontier assuming time-varying inefficiency
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Table 8: Instrumental Variable Approach Regressions of Estimated Technical Ef-
ficiencies on Budget Shares
No Instrument 1 Year Lag 2 Year Lag 3 Year Lag Country Average
Finland 0.324* 0.340 0.353 0.185 -0.335
(0.169) (0.208) (0.565) (0.947) (0.410)
Italy -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.198 -0.126 -0.106
(0.035) (0.063) (0.142) (0.278) (0.158)
Netherlands -0.129*** -0.126** -0.118 -0.022 -0.113
(0.024) (0.062) (0.113) (0.251) (0.219)
Norway 0.596*** 0.607** 0.610 0.387 -0.036
(0.170) (0.273) (0.548) (1.011) (0.425)
Portugal -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 -0.028 -0.189
(0.033) (0.078) (0.081) (0.111) (0.235)
Spain -0.479*** -0.484*** -0.491*** -0.425 -0.345**
(0.046) (0.076) (0.181) (0.326) (0.170)
United Kingdom -0.679*** -0.683*** -0.686*** -0.594 -0.526***
(0.052) (0.081) (0.209) (0.387) (0.194)
Trend Finland -0.005*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Trend Italy -0.009*** -0.009** -0.008* -0.006 -0.011**
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Trend Netherlands -0.005** -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
Trend Norway -0.035*** -0.035 -0.034 -0.031 -0.036
(0.001) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Trend Portugal -0.030*** -0.030* -0.031 -0.020 -0.004
(0.007) (0.017) (0.027) (0.049) (0.023)
Trend Spain -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.006*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Trend Switzerland -0.011*** -0.011* -0.010 -0.002 -0.017
(0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.019) (0.028)
Trend United Kingdom -0.003*** -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* -0.004
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Bsha Tuition 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.083 0.053 0.003
(0.022) (0.029) (0.075) (0.138) (0.054)
Bsha Int Public 0.007* 0.008*** 0.010** 0.019 0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009)
Bsha Private -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.016 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.024) (0.043)
Constant 0.884*** 0.888*** 0.892*** 0.809** 0.775***
(0.044) (0.075) (0.184) (0.343) (0.216)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2 8507.737 4296.788 3196.084 4692.439
Prob ¿ chi2 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
The dependent variable, the predicted technical efficiencies, are based on a stochastic
frontier estimation that assumes time-varying u
Column 2: Budget shares are not instrumented
Column 3: Budget shares are instrumented using a one year lag
Column 4: Budget shares are instrumented using a two year lag
Column 5: Budget shares are instrumented using a three year lag
Column 6: Budget shares are instrumented using country averages
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Table 9: GMM Regressions of Estimated Technical Efficiencies on Budget Shares
Pooled Frontier Time-Varying Panel Frontier
L.Efficiency 0.293*** 1.004
(0.099) (0.687)
Bsha Tuition -0.001 -0.000
(0.039) (0.035)
Bsha Int Public 0.003 -0.000
(0.005) (0.003)
Bsha Private 0.016* -0.000
(0.008) (0.012)
Finland -0.001 -0.001
(0.300) (0.228)
Italy -0.139* 0.000
(0.080) (0.149)
Netherlands -0.083 -0.000
(0.063) (0.139)
Norway 0.312 0.009
(0.590) (1.815)
Portugal -0.069 0.000
(0.089) (0.243)
Spain 0.031 -0.001
(0.098) (0.210)
United Kingdom -0.046 0.001
(0.108) (0.355)
Trend Finland -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Trend Italy 0.005 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Trend Netherlands 0.009** -0.000
(0.004) (0.006)
Trend Norway 0.012 -0.000
(0.008) (0.006)
Trend Portugal 0.008 -0.000
(0.011) (0.008)
Trend Spain -0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Trend Switzerland -0.005 0.000
(0.008) (0.009)
Trend United Kingdom 0.004** 0.000
(0.002) (0.005)
Constant 0.460*** -0.006
(0.123) (0.494)
N 2103.000 2103.000
Wald chi2 139.160 6.426e+08
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, robust standard errors are in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
The presented estimates correspond to two-step system GMM estimations,
assuming that only budget shares are endogenous.
Column 2: Predicted inefficiency, uˆ, based on pooled stochastic frontier
Column 3: uˆ based on panel stochastic frontier assuming time-varying inefficiency
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Table 10: Regressions of Estimated Technical Efficiencies on Budget Shares in-
cluding alternative sets of controls
Pooled, FullFE Pooled, Plain VarPanel, FullFE VarPanel, Plain
Trend Finland -0.006*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trend Italy -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.000)
Trend Netherlands 0.004 -0.003***
(0.002) (0.000)
Trend Norway 0.028*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trend Portugal 0.002 -0.003***
(0.005) (0.000)
Trend Spain -0.002*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Trend Switzerland 0.009*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.000)
Trend United Kingdom -0.001*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000)
Bsha Tuition 0.007 -0.001 -0.001** -0.008
(0.015) (0.002) (0.000) (0.014)
Bsha Int Public 0.004 0.009** -0.000 -0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008)
Bsha Private 0.005** 0.007 -0.000 0.017*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.009)
Constant 0.421*** 0.631*** 0.234*** 0.375***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.001) (0.086)
N 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000 2399.000
Wald chi2
Prob ¿ chi2 . 0.005 . 0.267
The table displays coefficients, robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
Column 2 and 3: uˆ based on pooled stochastic frontier
Column 4 and 5: uˆ based on panel stochastic frontier assuming time-varying inefficiency
Column 2 and 4: Inclusion of full set of fixed effects beside of country-specific trends
Column 3 and 5: No country-specific controls included
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Table 11: Estimates of Simplified Pooled Stochastic Frontier by Country
Italy NL Portugal Spain UK
lq2 -0.243** -0.054 -0.117 0.064 -0.440***
(0.114) (0.342) (0.235) (0.163) (0.049)
lq3 -0.126** -0.752** -0.255 0.257* -0.196***
(0.057) (0.378) (0.212) (0.150) (0.046)
q2q2 -0.035** -0.424*** -0.158 0.007 -0.112***
(0.017) (0.154) (0.387) (0.034) (0.012)
q3q3 -0.020** 0.325 -0.075 0.236** -0.053***
(0.010) (0.212) (0.127) (0.095) (0.018)
q2q3 0.006 -0.249 -0.097 -0.034 0.052***
(0.006) (0.204) (0.216) (0.058) (0.015)
lx1 0.244 0.313 0.155 0.173 0.398***
(0.558) (0.571) (0.593) (0.122) (0.064)
lx2 0.855 1.111* 0.645 0.321*** 0.409***
(0.587) (0.572) (0.601) (0.077) (0.046)
x1x1 0.219 -0.001 -0.082 0.181** 0.070***
(0.196) (0.307) (0.239) (0.071) (0.011)
x2x2 -0.109 0.231 0.182 0.040 0.070***
(0.187) (0.307) (0.285) (0.045) (0.015)
x1q2 -0.005 0.172 -0.102 0.006 -0.025
(0.050) (0.315) (0.405) (0.092) (0.021)
x1q3 -0.022 0.096 -0.197 -0.279*** -0.003
(0.061) (0.299) (0.284) (0.054) (0.012)
x2q2 0.022 -0.166 0.102 -0.177 0.058*
(0.053) (0.303) (0.457) (0.109) (0.031)
x2q3 0.041 -0.489 0.137 0.234*** -0.031
(0.069) (0.327) (0.357) (0.056) (0.024)
Trend Finland . . . . .
. . . . .
Trend Italy -0.005 . . . .
(0.029) . . . .
Trend Netherlands . 0.039*** . . .
. (0.006) . . .
Trend Norway . . . . .
. . . . .
Trend Portugal . . 0.003 . .
. . (0.035) . .
Trend Spain . . . -0.010*** .
. . . (0.003) .
Trend Switzerland . . . . .
. . . . .
Trend United Kingdom . . . . -0.011
. . . . (0.007)
Bsha Tuition 0.128* 0.190* -0.021 0.303*** -0.569***
(0.075) (0.112) (0.067) (0.091) (0.059)
Bsha Int Public -0.001 -0.007 -0.035 -0.059*** 0.008
(0.021) (0.007) (0.091) (0.015) (0.019)
Bsha Private -0.088*** -0.008 -0.102 0.040*** 0.026
(0.034) (0.027) (0.151) (0.011) (0.028)
Constant 0.494 0.787*** 0.719** 0.078 1.174***
(0.304) (0.294) (0.338) (0.128) (0.093)
lnsig2v
Constant -4.446 -4.869 -4.383 -5.022 -2.979***
(12.480) (11.208) (14.444) (10.720) (0.149)
Inefficiency
Bsha Tuition -0.648*** 10.160 6.592 -0.559 -3.546***
(0.174) (33.197) (4.490) (0.649) (0.364)
Bsha Int Public 0.022 -0.033 1.238 -0.832*** -0.173
(0.108) (2.424) (1.538) (0.239) (0.116)
Bsha Private -0.314*** 0.449 -0.719 1.101*** -0.364***
(0.119) (6.954) (2.419) (0.168) (0.119)
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 463.000 120.000 70.000 513.000 923.000
Wald chi2 123534.552 2926.040 1632.831 4948.351 108991.288
Prob ¿ chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The table displays coefficients, robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses;
*, ** and *** denote significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%
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